President to pick whomever he thought might best fit the role. This latitude could be both a blessing and a curse, depending on how it was applied.
Serving as a strategic leader during war will always be difficult regardless of the perceived righteousness of one's cause. A strategic leader must have a vision and the drive and energy to articulate and communicate that vision and a strategy to reach a desired endstate. The leaders, and particularly the Cabinet members, selected by the President can either assist in realizing that vision or, at worst, become a hindrance. The
President is allowed to select the members of his Cabinet, thus surrounding himself with 2 those that he perceives can best help achieve his endstate. This "help" can come in the form of a competent and capable ally who, trusted with the authority of the office, can accomplish much in the name of the cause. A person so entrusted can make the overall burden of the President less cumbersome and allow for a broader and longer perspective. Again this assumes this is the kind of ally the president wishes to have.
Jefferson Davis consistently chose another path in his selection of Confederate
Secretaries of War.
In 1861, Jefferson Davis undertook one of the most difficult tasks imaginable. As the newly elected President of the Confederate States of America, he was required to form an inclusive government that respected states rights and yet that would prove sufficiently strong against adversaries determined to reestablish the Union at all costs.
The Confederacy did start with a number of advantages not inherent in most rebellions.
It possessed its own land, men and resources inherent in the initially seven, eventually thirteen states that seceded, and it also possessed skilled leaders in both the political and military arena who would prolong their cause. In the end, however, this was not enough. What was required was a leader of vision and ability who was willing to work through subordinates entrusted with the commensurate authority. The task of building and running the Confederate government, any government for that matter, was simply too great for one individual to hold all the reins. To be sure, the President is in charge, but his subordinates must act with authority to accomplish the tasks necessary to achieve a desired endstate that he articulates through his guidance. Davis did not choose his vice president, Alexander Stephens of Georgia, who was the largest contributor to writing the Confederate Constitution, and his relations with him were lukewarm at best. They disagreed on most major political issues, and Davis did not take his council in picking cabinet members. 5 Regardless of whom he selected to fill his cabinet, it is unlikely they would have been in a position to influence Davis much, as he was looking for someone simply to execute his policy, versus an energetic, broad-minded war fighter. Walker's lackluster performance in the initial days and weeks of his appointment stemmed from his personal belief that there would be no war. He famously remarked that "he would wipe up with his pocket handkerchief any blood that eventually might be spilled over secession." 6 By the time he finally realized war would come, he sprang into action with much energy but still proved inadequate to the task. Congress went to work in identifying why Roanoke Island had fallen. Ultimately the realization that forces were available that could have helped the defenders, but did not, brought unfavorable attention on the War Department. Although he was not directly responsible for that disaster, perceptions regarding Benjamin as "too suave, too cool, too competent to be real" would hurt him, as would a belief that he still harbored relationships with friends in the North. 9 An incident in January in which he inadvertently almost cost the South "Stonewall" Jackson's services also reflected on him unfavorably.
Indeed, his inexperience with military matters and his inability to move around the easily bruised egos of senior military leadership did not serve him well. General Joseph E. Randolph also shared the sentiment of a number of prominent politicians that the Union "may overrun our frontier States and plunder our coast but, as for conquering us, the thing is an impossibility. There is no instance in history of a people as numerous as we are inhabiting a country so extensive as ours being subjected if true to themselves." 13 bureaucracy brought on by the routine running of the government, he was renewed. In the field reviewing troops was always where he felt most comfortable. Along the trip he was noted for his "good humor and graceful manners," quite the opposite of how most that had daily contact with him in Richmond would describe him. 21 He spent a day with his friend General Braxton Bragg and Bragg's corps and division commanders, sharing his thoughts of the situation with him and promoting officers and inspecting the soldiers.
He also visited General John C. Pemberton in Vicksburg, providing guidance and making recommendations on his defensive position, telegraphing Seddon and requesting heavy cannons be sent to Vicksburg as quickly as possible. 22 He offered guidance but again failed to clarify the command structure.
While his personal dislike for General Johnston, stemming from many prewar clashes back to their days together at West Point, may have been kept just below the surface, he sincerely sought to strengthen Johnston's command of both armies.
Nevertheless, his issuance of specific guidance to commanders and then disapproving Johnston's tactical plan undermined the general's authority. Although more tactically aware of the situation than Davis, Johnston proved unable to accept the full weight of the responsibilities of his command. The officer, therefore, did not press the issue of differing tactics with Davis, so the war in the West continued to be fought with a conflicting command structure.
Davis also began to rethink his position on retaining territory and the cost of Benjamin's ability to get along with Davis and influence him more than others had.
Perhaps it was because they were similar in their thought process and Davis was not intimidated personally or professionally by Seddon. Whatever the cause, they were able to work together to focus the war effort.
Davis was never in short supply of critics, and those that got along well with him tended to draw their fair share of criticism as well. The Virginia delegation had urged
Davis on his position on the impressments of slaves to help dig defensive fortifications.
Such impressments drew, however, much unfavorable criticism from Davis's opponents, and Seddon finally resigned his position in January 1865 over this. 
